From: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
This patch extends the set of calls to the secondary security module by
SELinux as well as revising a few existing calls to support other security
modules and to more cleanly stack with the capability module. Please
apply.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
---
25-akpm/security/selinux/hooks.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff -puN security/selinux/hooks.c~selinux-extend-and-revise-calls-to-secondary-module security/selinux/hooks.c
--- 25/security/selinux/hooks.c~selinux-extend-and-revise-calls-to-secondary-module 2004-06-22 11:09:57.846148768 -0700
+++ 25-akpm/security/selinux/hooks.c 2004-06-22 11:09:57.853147704 -0700
@@ -1389,11 +1389,11 @@ static int selinux_capset_check(struct t
{
int error;
- error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
+ error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
if (error)
return error;
- return secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1427,6 +1427,10 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *tab
u32 tsid;
int rc;
+ rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
tsec = current->security;
rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
@@ -1690,7 +1694,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(str
static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- return 0;
+ return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
}
@@ -1708,12 +1712,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (stru
PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL, NULL);
}
- /* Note that we must include the legacy uid/gid test below
- to retain it, as the new userland will simply use the
- value passed by AT_SECURE to decide whether to enable
- secure mode. */
- return ( atsecure || current->euid != current->uid ||
- current->egid != current->gid);
+ return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
}
static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -2058,6 +2057,12 @@ static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name
unsigned long flags,
void * data)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
@@ -2068,6 +2073,12 @@ static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name
static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
}
@@ -2111,6 +2122,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_link(stru
static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
}
@@ -2141,6 +2157,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct in
static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
}
@@ -2179,6 +2201,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(str
static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
struct nameidata *nd)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
if (!mask) {
/* No permission to check. Existence test. */
return 0;
@@ -2190,6 +2218,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(stru
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
@@ -2456,6 +2490,11 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct fil
static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 av;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, prot, flags);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
if (file) {
/* read access is always possible with a mapping */
@@ -2476,6 +2515,12 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file
static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long prot)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, prot);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return selinux_file_mmap(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags);
}
@@ -2573,6 +2618,12 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct f
static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
}
@@ -2648,12 +2699,23 @@ static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->rlim + resource;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
@@ -2688,6 +2750,11 @@ static int selinux_task_getscheduler(str
static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
{
u32 perm;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
(unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
@@ -3129,6 +3196,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_co
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int err;
+ err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
@@ -3847,6 +3918,11 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmi
char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
{
u32 perms;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
perms = SHM__READ;
_